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Abstract: Modern vehicles are equipped with hundreds of embedded networked 
components with computational, sensory and actuation powers. Reliable 
functioning and interaction of these components are vital for the safety of the 
vehicle and its passengers. We present an architecture that deals with the intra-
vehicular network at both component and system levels. At the component 
level, our technique formally verifies compatibility of each component with  
the rest of the system. At the system level, we provide means to define overall 
behaviour by using first-order logic rules in an ontological space. Overall, we 
eliminate the hazards associated with integrating heterogeneous components  
in a car network domain and enable a knowledgeable user to define network 
behaviour easily. 
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1 Introduction 
Vehicles today hide enormous complexity under the hood. A veritable universe of 
heterogeneous components inside must function in the most reliable and smooth way to 
meet the stringent real-time requirements of safety and passenger satisfaction. Until now, 
most of the research in the automotive domain has been geared towards either 
improvising ad hoc inter-vehicular networks for safety, infotainment, etc. (Hsu and Chen, 
2005; Yousefi et al., 2006), or optimising the intra-vehicular network (autosar; 
Berwanger et al., 2001; CAN, 1992). Not as much attention has been paid to the problem 
of static and dynamic verification of intra-vehicle network’s components. Such verification 
is essential to ensure that there is no feature interaction or conflicting behaviour between 
components. Also, there is a need to enable the driver and passengers to control their 
ambient environment in a more customisable way than is presently possible. 
The vision of pervasive computing is to have a wealth of embedded processors and 
applications serving user needs in an imperceptible way (Weiser, 1999). To realise this 
vision, there must exist complete harmony and interoperability among all the components 
(Edwards and Grinter, 2001). The intelligent vehicular ad hoc networks (InVANETs) can 
be categorised as enablers of a pervasive environment where the vehicles communicate 
with each other and with roadside equipment to facilitate passengers through applications 
ranging from traffic congestion control to commerce. Similarly, the intra-vehicular 
network of embedded processors, sensors and other nodes can be thought of as a smaller 
universe in the immediate vicinity of the passengers, comprising applications and 
functions that envelope the passengers in a pervasive computing environment. 
Generally, the closed domain of an automobile is like any other intelligent 
environment with a boundary (physical or logical), e.g. a smart home, a railway carriage 
or an industrial plant. It is a microcosm of a pervasive environment where concurrent 
applications running in electronic control units (ECUs) share many common sensors, 
actuators and feedback paths through the physical part of the domain, while having to 
abide by common, basic liveness and consistency rules to ensure proper operation of the 
vehicular domain. 
The term feature interaction has its roots in the telecommunications field and was 
coined by Bellcore in the early 80s (Keck and Kuehn, 1998). We can think of a feature as 
a unit of functionality – a facet of behaviour – of a system. Some feature interactions are 
harmless but the majority is severely damaging to system development and user 
expectations. It is a major research challenge to predict, identify and resolve feature 
interactions. Cameron et al. (1994) is the seminal paper for telephony interactions and 
lists many examples. Bowen et al. (1989) give the first framework for studying the 
feature interaction problem. 
There are many other areas where the feature interaction problem has been studied. 
Turner et al. (1999) make a case for recognising features as first-class objects in the 
software process and introduce the area of feature engineering to incorporate their role in 
a broad range of software life-cycle activities. According to Calder and Magill (2000): 
The subject [of feature interaction] has relevance to any domain where separate 
software entities control a shared resource. 
Hence, pervasive computing environments like a vehicular network certainly represent 
domains where feature interaction is likely to take place. This means that the functionality 
of different nodes in the car network represent features and have the potential to interact 
in a conflicting manner. 
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Our previous work (Alvi and Greaves, 2006; Alvi and Greaves, 2008; Greaves et al., 
2008) has focused on using a home domain as a testbed for our techniques. There, we 
successfully implemented a prototype system that controlled the various devices and 
appliances in a reliable, conflict-free and easily configurable manner. We have also 
developed data structures, algorithms, and parallel computing methods for stochastic 
modelling and (probabilistic) model checking of large-scale systems using different high-
level formalisms, e.g. see Mehmood (2004); Mehmood and Crowcroft (2005). We can 
use these techniques in conjunction to provide more flexible and complete low-level and 
high-level control of large-scale pervasive domains. 
We should note that existing methodologies for safety critical software, like Ravenscar 
Profile (Burns, 1999) for Ada and other coding standards, are good at avoiding certain 
types of coding error, such as dangling pointers, overflow and infinite loops, but a totally 
different approach is needed to handle issues of system-level concurrency. Another 
relevant software architecture is the 4D-RCS Reference Model Architecture for military 
unmanned vehicles (Albus et al., 2002). 
The recent automotive standardisation effort AUTOSAR (automotive open system 
architecture) autosar by manufacturers, vendors and tool developers aims to define a 
common E/E (electrical/electronic) component-based software architecture to facilitate 
scalability, integration, transferability and maintainability. AUTOSAR has safety as one 
of its prime goals and invites novel techniques to fulfil the stringent safety requirements 
of automotive applications. To enable feature interaction checks in AUTOSAR, we 
augment it with ontologies and rule bundles. At design time, when ECUs are configured 
through the AUTOSAR pipeline, detection of any feature interaction terminates the process. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the two-pronged 
approach. An enhancement to the AUTOSAR standard that focuses on a check for 
feature interaction at design time is given in Section 3. We give an overview of location-
based-services (LBS) in the vehicular domain in Section 4. Advantages of the two-
pronged approach are listed in Section 5 and related work is outlined in Section 6. 
Section 7 concludes this paper. 
2 The two-pronged approach 
2.1 Overview of architecture 
Our control and verification model of the vehicle’s network is operative at two levels: 
component and system (Figure 1). The component level design ensures that all the 
network components (microcontrollers, sensors and actuators) are formally verified to 
cause no feature interaction with other components and to obey some standing rules 
defined by the designers of the system. An ontology substrate is used to hold the 
attributes of the system to perform various types of reasoning over them (consistency 
checking and classification). Higher level rules in first-order logic authored by the 
designers and the owner of the car form the system level. 
2.2 Component level verification and control 
In our approach, space is divided into domains and components are prevented from 
sending commands over the network in the vehicular domain until their internal 
applications have been validated by a Domain Manager. To do this, they offer an 
application digest which is a description of their active behaviour, so that automated 
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reasoning techniques, like model checking, can be run before granting an application 
code bundle the right to send commands (Greaves et al., 2008). For example, the 
accelerator pedal sensor cannot send commands to the fuel intake valve without such 
vetting beforehand at design time. 
As illustrated in Figure 2, we can represent the car network as a domain of 
participation (DoP), demarcated by the dotted line, comprising sensors, actuators, ECUs, 
application bundles and an ontological car model. A DoP corresponds to a community of 
participating applications that are sharing resources and which may interact in various 
intended and unintended ways, potentially causing feature interaction. A simple DoP is 
typically a physical space, such as a vehicle, house or factory. The Domain Manager uses 
a summary of the behaviour of each component to check whether the components are 
compatible. Each component may also offer assertions that it wishes to be held in the 
networked domain. There are a number of standing rules of the domain that ensure safety 
and liveness and prohibit command conflicts. The ontological car model gets updated 
dynamically as a result of changes in the state of the car domain. This happens due to the 
arriving and departing components and the functioning of different nodes in the domain, 
such as sensors and actuators. 
There are many potential forms of application digest: in previous work, we 
investigated reflecting the key behaviour of the components using our Pushlogic 
language (Alvi and Greaves, 2006) and Common Intermediate Language bytecode used 
by the .NET Framework and Mono1 (Greaves et al., 2008). Any popular bytecode format 
for which a variety of compilers exist can be chosen. Figure 3 shows how the application 
bundle from one of the components of the car network written in .NET bytecode for a 
generic but standard car network ontology is first rehydrated, i.e. bound. It is bound by 
the Domain Manager to the specific car manufacturer and model by using the resident 
ontology. It is then checked against the standing rules for the car network and against the 
code of other applications to detect any feature interaction. A successful completion of 
the verification step allows that component to be functional. Otherwise, it is rejected. 
The car domain is dynamic in the number of components as we replace and add them 
during the lifetime of the car, e.g. engine parts, on-board global positioning system 
(GPS), navigation system and music system. This means that there will be continuous on-
the-fly verification of application digests for inter-compatibility, in addition to design 
time verification. As an example, consider the dynamic docking of a music player with 
the on-steering-column volume and transport controls. In this case, dynamic checking at 
the time of the binding seems sensible. The required functionality should not, in any way, 
be compromised by such dynamic verifications and bindings. For instance, the traffic 
announcement messages on the radio must still be able to pause the playing track. Hence, 
there is a need to adopt and develop efficient offline and online verification techniques. 
Figure 1 Two levels of car network control (see online version for colours) 
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Figure 2 DoP representation of car network 
 
Figure 3 Binding and checking application bundles 
 
Our repository of knowledge about the car network domain is in the form of an ontology. 
Both component level and system level verification and control mechanisms make use of 
the same ontological database, which we describe next.  
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2.3 Ontology knowledge base 
We make use of an ontology knowledge base to both capture the properties and state of 
the vehicular network and apply rules to constrain its behaviour. This enables the car 
manufacturer and the car owner to further define the behaviour of the components and 
the composite services at a system level of abstraction. The lower component level 
verifications also use the same ontological database, which is populated at design time  
by the manufacturer. Hence, the safety and liveness assertions range over terms and 
predicates that are defined by the machine-readable ontology. 
In a recent definition by Gruber2 in Liu and Özsu (2009), ontology is defined in the 
context of information and computer sciences as: 
An ontology defines a set of representational primitives with which to model a 
domain of knowledge or discourse. 
The representational primitives are typically classes (or sets), attributes and relationships 
among class members. 
Ontologies are at a higher, semantic level as compared to the physical level of 
database schema (Grimm and Volz, 2007; Uschold and Gruninger, 2004). Thus, 
ontologies can be used to integrate disparate databases and knowledge sources. 
We use the term ontology to mean a data model that is used to represent different 
concepts or entities in a domain of knowledge along with their relationships. Stated 
mathematically, we define an ontology O as quadruple (C,I,P,R) where C is a set of 
classes or concepts in the domain of interest, I is a set of instances or individuals of a 
class, P is a set of properties or roles of classes and R is a set of relations between 
classes, e.g. isA, subClassOf, sameClass. Within a Car domain, we can have a class 
MusicPlayer with an instance CDPlayer that has the property hasSixCDs. See Figure 4 
for a simple example that shows part of a vehicular ontology with classes in boxes and 
attributes in ovals. It also shows the relationship between classes (isA and hasA). 
Figure 4 Vehicle ontology (see online version for colours) 
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Knowledge representation languages with well-defined formal semantics are used  
to express ontologies so that they can be machine-processable. These include OWL  
(web ontology language) owl, Gellish (van Renssen, 2003), KIF (knowledge interchange 
format) kif and RIF (rule interchange format) rif, etc. 
Description logics (DLs) are a family of knowledge representation languages that can 
denote a domain’s knowledge in a structured and formal way. Important notions of the 
domain are represented by concept descriptions (Staab and Studer, 2004). That is, atomic 
concepts (unary predicates) and atomic roles (binary predicates) are used to form 
expressions using the concept and role constructors provided by the particular DL. They 
typically form decidable fragments of the first-order logic predicate calculus restricted to 
unary and binary predicates to capture the nodes and arcs in a network graph. The basic 
elements used to represent knowledge in the DL formalism are concepts, individuals and 
roles, where concepts are analogous to classes of things, individuals to instances and 
roles to relationships between things. DLs use concept constructors to build complex 
concepts out of simple ones. 
The OWL DL and OWL Lite sub-languages of OWL can be translated into an expressive 
DL. Ontology entailment in OWL DL (respectively, OWL Lite) can be reduced to 
knowledge base (un)satisfiability in the DL SHOIN(D) (respectively, SHI F(D)). 
A DL knowledge base, or an ontology, contains statements about the domain of 
interest in the form of DL axioms and is composed of a TBox (terminological box) and  
an ABox (assertional box). The TBox captures the so-called terminological knowledge, 
which comprises general statements within a domain describing relationships between 
concepts, e.g. All men are mortal. TBox axioms can be thought of as class axioms. On 
the other hand, the ABox, captures the so-called assertional knowledge, which comprises 
statements about particular individuals and situations, e.g. Socrates is a man. ABox 
axioms describe relations between individuals and concepts. 
Some standard reasoning tasks within the DL framework are: 
• Knowledge base satisfiability: This is equivalent to validation of a knowledge base, 
also called ontology consistency. 
• Concept satisfiability: To check if a given concept can have any instances, and is 
also called ontology coherency. 
• Instance checking: This is a test for class membership by checking if an individual is 
an instance of a given concept. This task can be extended to type inference by 
determining all the named classes that serve as types for an individual. 
• Subsumption: This is to check if a given concept is a subconcept of another one. This 
is considered a distinguishing feature of DLs as opposed to other formalisms, and is 
also known as classification. 
We are mainly concerned with two reasoning tasks in our framework: 
• Validation: To detect any contradictions in the modelled information in the ontology. 
• Deduction: To derive implicit conclusions from the information in the ontology, 
capturing the notion of logical consequence. 
2.4 System level verification and control 
At design time, the manufacturer will populate its car ontology with the properties and 
roles of the various electronically capable elements of the car. This is done automatically 
as each element supplies its attributes to the ontological registry. Our implementation 
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uses extensible markup language (XML) format for this information. In future, a standard 
ontology across cars and parts manufacturers will greatly facilitate this task. Information 
about non-electronic parts of the system can also be added. For example, a class 
OwnerFamily can be predefined with its specific values left to the actual owner to fill in 
through an interface. 
An ontology provides a formal, machine-readable taxonomy of a system and brings 
the benefits of the semantic web (Berners et al., 2001) and its accompanying technologies. 
We have used the Protégé-OWL ontology editor (protege; Knublauch et al., 2004) to 
define our car ontology. The ontological model is stored internally in description logic 
(OWL DL) (owl, 2004) and provides reasoning and classification abilities. A reasoning 
engine can make explicit all the implicit relationships (e.g. subClassOf) and perform 
consistency checks etc. The DIG (DL implementation group) compliant reasoner Racer 
(renamed abox and concept expression reasoner) (racer, n.d.) is employed to classify the 
taxonomy and to find inconsistencies in it. 
A further ability is to define rules in description logic both by the car manufacturer at 
design time and by the car owner. In our system, rules, are written in SWRL (semantic 
web rule language) (swrl; O’Connor et al., 2005) and we use Jess (Java expert system 
shell) (Jess; O’Connor et al., 2005) to reason about them. SWRL is a syntactic and 
semantic extension of OWL DL. It is based on a combination of the OWL DL and OWL 
Lite sub-languages of the OWL Web Ontology Language with the Unary/Binary Datalog 
RuleML sub-languages of the rule markup language (RuleML). SWRL is a syntactic and 
semantic extension of OWL DL: it extends OWL axioms to include Horn-like rules.  
A Horn clause is a disjunction of literals with at most one positive literal. 
Following is an example rule, in pseudo language, inserted at design time by the 
manufacturer: 
if ((car key in ignition) ∧ (door open)) → (sound alarm) (1) 
Following is an example rule, added by the car owner: 
if ((number of passengers)> 1) → (lock doors when car starts) (2) 
Rules give the user means for regulating the car network’s behaviour, appropriate for 
many forms of specification. Rule engines vary in their performance and memory use but 
Protégé provides flexibility by allowing selection of the best rule engine for a given 
domain. 
SWRL rules are stored as OWL individuals with their associated knowledge base. All 
the OWL instances and SWRL rules are automatically mapped onto Jess facts and Jess 
rules, respectively. Any new classifications or properties resulting from executing the 
Jess inference engine are written back to the OWL knowledge base. Although SWRL is 
an undecidable superset of OWL DL, it can be restricted to assure decidability. 
To simplify rule writing, we have designed a Java application which provides the 
user with a simple graphical user interface (GUI) using buttons to input rules. Let us 
consider a rule example where the user wants to automatically turn on the air-condition 
(AC) if the temperature is over 30°. From the main menu, the user presses the 
‘Temperature’ button and is prompted to enter the temperature value. She enters 30. The 
next menu presents a list of components that can be controlled with temperature, which 
in this case are Windows and AC. If AC is selected, another prompt asks whether the  
AC should be turned ON or OFF at a temperature of 30°. The user selects ON.  
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Figure 5 GUI screenshots 
 
Some screenshots of this process are given in Figure 5. At the back end, the following 
SWRL rule is generated: 
Car(?c) ∧ hasTemperature(?c, 30) → isACOn(?c, true) (3) 
Table 1 shows the XML automatically generated for this rule. This application can easily 
be ported to a car where it can be accessed via a touch screen on the dashboard/console. 
An important question is where to store the ontology? As the ontology serves as a 
registry for all the components, it is not feasible or useful to store all of it on-board the 
vehicle. hi fact, there is a strong case for not allowing the owners of the car access to the 
fine granularity component level tasks for their own safety and for proper functioning of 
the system. It suffices to save only those non-safety critical parts of the ontology within 
the vehicle that can be used in logic rules for passenger comfort. Some of these rules will 
be predefined at the factory and others will be defined by the owners, as discussed above. 
However, the rule base stored in the vehicle will contain all the relevant safety rules 
inserted at design time by the manufacturer to prevent any user-defined ones from 
violating them. For example, an owner might define a rule that involves opening the  
boot of the car while the car is moving. This would be caught by the reasoner as being in 
conflict with a preloaded unalterable safety rule that prevents the boot of a moving car 
from opening. 
Other systems have been proposed that make use of ontologies, e.g. vehicle assembly 
plant diagnostics system (Chougule and Chakrabarty, 2009) and dynamic path planning 
of autonomous vehicles (Provine et al., 2004). Angele et al. (2008) give a semantics-
based approach for improving the process of testing different configurations of cars. 
3 Feature interaction check at design time 
In this section, we describe the AUTOSAR ECU configuration process and illustrate how 
we have extended it to check for feature interaction.  
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Table 1 ACOn.xml XML produced for rule 3 
 
AUTOSAR concepts are defined in the form of a domain specific XML exchange format 
(Pagel and Br, 2006). This format enables a seamless configuration process of the basic 
software stack and integration of application software in ECUs. The ECU configuration 
process at design time consists of four steps: 
1 configure system 
2 extract ECU-specific information 
3 configure ECU 
4 generate executable to burn/flash the ECU. 
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To check for feature interaction, we have added an extra step (shown in Figure 6) at the 
beginning of the standard AUTOSAR configuration process. In this step, the ontology  
of different ECUs with SWRL rules is provided as input to Protégé. If any feature 
interaction is detected, a flag is raised and the configuration process terminates. 
In the automotive domain, a seminal example is the feature interaction between safety 
and security features (Calder et al., 2003; Juarez-Dominguez et al., 2007). The job of the 
security feature is to ensure that the car is locked at all times while the safety feature 
ensures the well-being of the occupants. In case of an accident or a crash, the safety 
mechanism unlocks all doors automatically to allow the passengers to get out of harm’s 
way. But this feature also exposes a security pitfall: if a thief hits the front of a stationary 
to mimic a crash, all doors will automatically unlock, which is in conflict with the job of 
the security feature. On the component level, this interaction takes place between the 
Crash ECU and the Theft Deterrent ECU. The ECU common to both of these is the Door 
Lock ECU. In case of a pseudo crash, the Crash ECU tells the Door Lock ECU to unlock 
the doors. This is contrary to the role of the Theft Deterrent ECU. 
To catch such kind of feature interaction, our enhancement to the AUTOSAR 
pipeline makes use of ontology and rule bundles. The ontology follows the structure and 
connections of the ECU configuration XML and the SWRL rules depict the behaviour of 
the ECU software. We envision that in future, car manufactures will provide a rule 
bundle with every ECU. These rules would define the outlook of the system in various 
scenarios. Security and safety ontologies are shown separately in Figures 7 and 8. When 
both of these features in the form of ontologies are mapped in Protégé at design time, it 
would raise a feature interaction flag after running them through an inference engine, 
depicting that the current rule bundles are inconsistent. 
The security bundle consists of the following rules: 
RemoteLockControl(?r) ∧ isOpenPressed(?r, true) 
∧ DoorLock(?d) → isLocked(?d, false) (4) 
RemoteLockControl(?r) ∧ isClosePressed(?r, true) 
∧ DoorLock(?d) → isLocked(?d, true) (5) 
Figure 6 Enhanced AUTOSAR ECU configuration (see online version for colours) 
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Figure 7 Security ontology (see online version for colours) 
 
Figure 8 Safety ontology (see online version for colours) 
 
Rule (4) unlocks all doors when the lock button on the remote control is pressed while 
Rule (5) locks them. 
IgnitionSwitchSensor(?i) ∧ keyInIgnition(?i, true) 
∧ DoorSensor(?c) ∧ isClosed(?c, true) 
∧ DoorLock(?d) → isLocked(?d, true) (6) 
The job of Rule (6) is to lock all doors when the key is in the ignition and all doors are 
closed. 
IgnitionSwitchSensor(?i) ∧ keyInIgnition(?i, false) 
∧ DoorSensor(?c) ∧ isClosed(?c, true) 
∧ RemoteLockControl(?r) 
∧ isOpenPressed(?r, false) 
∧ DoorLock(?d) → isLocked(?d, true) (7) 
Rule (7) ensures that all doors remain closed when the car is parked.  
The safety bundle primarily consists of the following rule: 
CrashSensor(?cs) ∧ isCrash(?cs, true) 
∧ DoorLock(?d) → isLocked(?d, false) (8) 
Rule (8) force unlocks all doors when there is a crash. 
When both of these ontologies and rule bundles are combined, any feature interaction 
between the two can be detected. In case of a pseudo crash, there would be a conflict 
between Rules (7) and (8) with the former trying to keep the doors locked, while the 
latter force-unlocking them. At design time, as soon as this conflict is detected, the ECU 
configuration mechanism will come to a halt and raise a flag due to functional nature of 
the datatype property isLocked, suggesting the current rule bundle is inadequate to define 
the overall behaviour of the components. To resolve this conflicts the car manufacturer 
would have to modify Rules (7) and (8) to Rule (9) and Rule (10) with the resulting 
ontology shown in Figure 9. 
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IgnitionSwitchSensor(?i) ∧ keyInIgnition(?i, false) 
∧ DoorSensor(?c) ∧ isClosed(?c, true)  
∧ RemoteLockControl(?r)  
∧ isOpenPressed(?r, false)  
∧ PassengerOccupencySensor(?p)  
∧ passengersPresent(?p, false) 
∧ DoorLock(?d) → isLocked(?d, true) (9) 
CrashSensor(?cs) ∧ isCrash(?cs, true) 
∧ PassengerOccupencySensor(?p) 
∧ passengersPresent(?p, true) 
∧ DoorLock(?d) → isLocked(?d, false) (10) 
Rule (10) will ensure that the doors should be unlocked only if there are passengers in the 
car, thus complying with the goals of the security feature. 
We have also devised a method to handle feature interaction in a more intelligent 
way: by prioritising applications. As a result, pulling down of a car window by a 
passenger can take precedence over the AC system’s goal of a lower temperature on a hot 
summer day. Or, a proximity sensor output can make the system take control of the car 
and may limit manoeuvring of the car by the driver. This is described in more detail in 
the next section. 
3.1 CAN-bus prioritisation 
In this section, we introduce controller area network (CAN) and describe how to make 
use of it to filter out unwanted packets sent by compromised ECUs. 
CAN is a high-speed serial network to connect microcontrollers and devices within 
an automotive environment (Tong et al., 2007). It employs a message broadcast-based 
protocol. Each entity within the network can send and receive messages, but not at the 
same time. Messages are transmitted serially onto the bus with priorities based on IDs. 
Some of its features include: 
• fast reaction time 
• multi-master communication 
• high level of reliability 
• low physical medium cost. 
Figure 9 Combined safety and security ontology (see online version for colours) 
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Our testbed consists of a Linux machine which makes use of SocketCAN3 to prioritise 
different features. SocketCAN is an open source implementation of CAN contributed to 
the Linux kernel by Volkswagen Research4. It can be configured to run in the standard 
Linux environment by enabling the CAN-bus module and recompiling the kernel. The 
SocketCAN concept extends berkeley software distribution (BSD) sockets by introducing 
a new protocol family PF_CAN. To test our feature prioritisation mechanism, we created 
a virtual network of ECUs which could transmit and receive data frames. The 
transmission and reception part of the code is shown in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. In 
Table 2, frame.can_id holds the CAN ID of the virtual ECU while frame.data holds the 
data frame to be transmitted. We also coded a filter capable of blocking frames on the 
basis of their CAN IDs. Frames from different ECUs were blocked at random assuming 
that they contributed to feature interaction. 
Table 2 Sending a SocketCAN frame 
struct can_frame frame; 
frame.can_id =20; 
strcpy( (&frame . data , argv [1] ) ; 
frame.can_dlc = strlen ( &frame.data );  
int bytes_sent = write( skt, &frame , sizeof(frame) ); 
Table 3 Receiving a SocketCAN frame 
int bytes_read = read (skt, &frame, sizeof (frame) ) ; 
priintf (“Read : \%s|n”, &frame . data); 
 
In the actual CAN-bus, this filter exists in hardware. Our Domain Manager will control 
the hardware filter by setting register values. For example, if pulling down of a window 
has a higher priority than the AC then, when they interact, the Domain Manager will tell 
the filter to drop frames sent by the AC ECU, based on its CAN ID. Hence, no feature 
interaction will take place. 
Many other rules can be written to make use of CAN-bus prioritisation: 
• any speed limits coming in real time from traffic management centre will have 
higher priority 
• a crash (internal sensor) will have higher priority 
• a message from the vehicular network informing about an accident somewhere on 
the road in front will have higher priority 
• a message or a sensor input about decreasing speed of the front car will have higher 
priority. 
4 Location based services 
Location-based services (LBS) make use of contextual information of users and/ 
or devices to provide some service. According to Junglas and Watson (2008), in the  
four-year period from 2006 to 2010 the LBS market of Asia was expected to grow from  
$291.7 million to $447 million, Europe’s from $191 million to $622 million and the  
US market from $150 million to $3.1 billion. Activity inference can also be activated as a 
result of location detection (Dey et al., 2010) which will provide long-lasting services or 
experiences. LBS researchers agree that there are two types of LBSs: location-tracking 
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services in which parties/entities other than the user track the user’s location and position-
aware services in which the device makes use of its own location (Barkhuus and Dey, 
2003). It is important to distinguish between these two because of the implications for 
privacy and information security. 
LBSs also exist in the automotive domain, of which car navigation systems are one 
example. Our system also allows LBS to be handled by the Domain Manager (introduced 
in Section 2.2) which contains rules on how to process location information and which 
ECUs to forward it to. It has a list of GPS coordinates and information about the 
locations that these coordinates represent. We illustrate this with an example. 
Traditional cruise control systems have a ‘speed limiter’ function with a pre-set 
maximum speed limit to keep the acceleration of the car in check. Our system enables 
this maximum speed limit to be dynamic depending on the location. The Domain 
Manager has a bundle of speed limits. It receives GPS coordinates from the GPS/ 
navigation system ECU (through the CAN-bus) and maps these onto speed limits and 
forwards them to the cruise control ECU (again over the CAN-bus). For example, let the 
driver get on to Road X. From the coordinates received from the GPS ECU, the Domain 
Manager will know that Road X has started. It will match this information with the speed 
limits list and forward a limit, say 60 km hr−1, to the cruise control ECU, which will in 
turn set it as its speed limit. 
The SWRL rules are: 
Car(?c) ∧ hasGPSXCoordinate(?c, 20.01) 
∧ hasGPSYCoordinate(?c, 30.02) 
→ hasLocation(?c, RoadX) (11) 
Car(?c) ∧ hasLocation(?c, RoadX) 
→ hasCruiseLimit(?c, 60) (12) 
The speed limits will be provided by the local traffic law enforcement. 
5 Advantages of the two-pronged approach 
In general, an ontology is used as a domain model to share, reuse, analyse and better 
engineer knowledge (Jones et al., 1998). A particularly useful benefit is the separation of 
domain knowledge from operational knowledge (Noy and Mcguinness, 2001), which 
enables the development of applications without requiring specialised knowledge of a 
particular domain. Hence, an ontological model serves as a convenient data reflection 
API for programmers while avoiding the rigid schema of databases. This allows systems 
to evolve better. 
Combining checkable application digests with rules in the DL-based ontology server 
allows heterogeneous components to interact correctly and reliably. This means that 
semantic interoperability (the unambiguous and correct interpretation of exchanged data 
by two systems), safety and reliability are ensured in the composed system. This 
approach has the following advantages: 
• conflicting behaviour, or feature interaction, is avoided in the car network domain of 
interacting components 
• overall system behaviour can be constrained by a set of overseeing rules. 
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Adequate tool support is available, both off-the-shelf and developed by us, to enable 
checkable and reliable real-time control of the pervasive system comprising heterogeneous 
components. The system is extensible because the ontological representations of new 
parts of the knowledge base can be added in a consistent manner. 
In our architecture, the Domain Manager can also leverage contextual information to 
provide various services. As shown in the previous section, these services can be both 
safety and leisure related. 
6 Related work 
Cilia and Buchmann (2002) make use of web services and active databases for 
customising user behaviour in a vehicle. Data and metadata are interpreted by using 
ontologies as shared concepts. An ontology service is used to expose, store and manage 
all the concepts defined in the ontologies. Eigner and Lutz (2008) present a system to 
avoid vehicular collisions and accidents by using remote sensor data such as rain 
intensity, distance to the car in front, etc. This data exchange is made possible by 
VANETs. Contextual information is defined in the form of ontologies which can also be 
used by other applications. Sun et al. (2010) have also employed ontologies to represent 
contextual information. This contextual information is used to model the relationship 
between different components inside a smart car. A conversational dialog system for 
automobile drivers is described by Yan et al. (2007). The system enables the driver to 
control different components of the car such as the stereo and navigation systems. All 
domain knowledge is structured in the form of an ontology. The only other work that we 
know of that comes close to our work has been presented by Sandkuhl and Billig (2007) 
in which ontologies are used for integrated management of artefacts in automotive 
electronics. Such artefacts include metamodels, documents, metadata, etc. Although, this 
method enables car manufacturers to manage a wide array of product variations, it does 
not check for conflicts or feature interaction. 
7 Conclusion and future work 
We have shown that employing an ontological control plane with description, logic 
semantics is conducive to integration with a rule-based approach to network control.  
We have adapted our previous work on smart homes to develop a two-tier verification 
and control architecture for the car domain. We use open source software tools and  
the performance of the system is reasonable because the intensive reasoning part is 
predominantly performed at design time. Only computationally minor reasoning tasks are 
performed during actual use of the vehicle. Through an enhancement to the AUTOSAR 
standard, we have shown that feature interaction can be mitigated at the design stage. 
Moreover, our architecture can make use of rule bundles and location information to 
provide a wide variety of services to vehicles. 
Our future work includes running quantitative and qualitative tests on the useability 
of our system. In this context, we also plan to leverage our earlier work in LBS (Ayres  
et al., 2009) and distributed virtualisation (Mehmood et al., 2005). We are developing a 
comprehensive ontology for the car domain that can serve as a starting point in the future 
standardisation efforts. We are also working on improving the efficiency of automated 
reasoning in our system. Moreover, we are exploring different methodologies to protect 
on-board components from external attacks. To this effect, we are in the process of 
implementing a novel inter-VANET firewall.  
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